题目：The (In)Visibility of Political Connections
报告人：巴黎高等商学院会计及管理控制系 Wu Han 助理教授
时间：2021年3月31日（周三） 9:00-12:00
地点：米兰网页版,米兰(中国),米兰(中国)313室
欢迎各位老师和同学届时积极参加！
报告摘要：
We study the extent to which market participants are informed about firms’ political connections when the connections are not publicly disclosed and how it affects pricing efficiency. Using a sample of public announcements of government officials’ corruption investigations, we find that, on average, investors do not realize that officials under investigation are connected to firms in which they have invested and that the value of those connections has been lost. This finding suggests that the connections generally are of low visibility to investors. However, institutional investors know about at least some of the connections and abnormally sell their shares in the firms when investigations are announced. The loss of value of the connections is not fully incorporated into stock prices until the connections are subsequently disclosed, and price incorporation is slower for the connections that have been less visible to institutional investors. Our results suggest that lack of visibility significantly harms pricing efficiency of political connections.
报告嘉宾简介：
Wu Han，巴黎高等商学院会计及管理控制系助理教授，他在2016年于挪威经济学院获得会计学博士学位，目前已在国际会计学顶级期刊Review of Accounting Studies与国际管理学顶级期刊(UTD24)Management Science发表多篇学术论文，同时还担任国际知名会计学期刊Contemporary Accounting Research、European Accounting Review以及Accounting and Business Research的匿名审稿人。他的主要研究方向为公司治理。
